

ANIMAL RIGHTS GOOD

~~file~~ by Annelise,

Will, Posie,
Liz, & David

Right to fair treatment 1-4

Pain deserves Rights 5-7

Interests deserve Rights 8-10

animals have inherent value 11-13

animals are rational 14-16

human Rights not same as
animal rights 17-18

A2 Cartesian thinking 19-20



KNDIE GT
Anthro Shiznit
Rights

Right to fair
treatment

1/4

All species should have the right to
not be tortured

Rachels, 1989 [James, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 124]

[Now let me give some illustrations of the kinds of results which may be obtained by this method. Article 5 of The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that all men have a right not be subjected to torture. But is this, in fact, a distinctively *human* right? If members of other species—say, rabbits or pigs or monkeys—are tortured, they also suffer. Of course, there are many impressive differences between men and these animals, but are they relevant here? A man can learn mathematics, and a rabbit can't; but what does that have to do with the business of being tortured? A man has an interest in not being tortured because he has the capacity to suffer pain, and not because he can do mathematics or anything of that sort. But rabbits, pigs, and monkeys also have the capacity to experience pain, and so they have the same basic interest in not being tortured. The right not to be tortured, then, is shared by all animals that suffer pain; it is not a distinctively human right at all. On the other hand, Article 18 of the same Declaration says that all men have the right to worship as they please. This, I think, is a right belonging only to humans, because only humans have religious beliefs and a capacity for worship.]



"I was in the Godfather,"
-Mr. Ed

KNDI GT
ANOTHER SHIZUIT
Right

Right to fair
treatment

2/4

SEVERAL REASONS TO GRANT RTS 2 ANIMALS

Tom REGAN philosophy, North Carolina St. U 1983 The Case 4 Animal Rights

1
AT: First, justice—unlike charity, for example—is something one can intelligibly claim as one's due, something that one is owed. Though a representative of the United Way has no valid basis on which to claim that I owe it to his organization in particular to make a financial contribution, he does have a moral basis on which to claim that I owe it to him to treat him as justice requires. This is true regardless of how justice is interpreted; it is not peculiar to the interpretation favored here. Even a perfectionist theory (see 7.1) allows that justice is owed to anyone who can be treated justly or unjustly; it just so happens that, on perfectionist theories, what is due varies considerably, depending upon how much or how little different individuals happen to possess certain virtues (e.g., artistic talents). There is, therefore, nothing conceptually odd in maintaining that individuals who have inherent value can claim just treatment as their due, or have this claimed on their behalf, because they have a right to such treatment. Since what is being claimed as their right is something claimed as their due, since justice is due them, and since the duty of justice is an unacquired duty, there is nothing logically untoward in

↓ correlating a basic right to just treatment with the unacquired duty of justice.

3
As
Reat
90W
Second, if one's making a claim to just treatment is to be valid, then both the claim-to and claim-against aspects of such a claim must be valid. Demands for just treatment, when these are informed by the notion of respect central to the respect principle, can be validated on both counts. Such claims are valid claims-to. I can specify what it is that I am claiming as my due (namely, treatment that accords with the respect principle) and the treatment I claim as my due is within the powers or capacities of those against whom I make the claim. Moreover, the claim I make is a valid claim-against, first, because I can identify those individuals against whom I make it—namely, all those moral agents who do or might have any moral dealings with me—and, second, because the claim I make against them is, in Feinberg's words, "called for" by a valid moral principle, the respect principle. My claim to respectful treatment, therefore, is a valid claim all considered, and thus, given the analysis of moral rights as valid claims, I have the moral right to be treated with respect.

Third, the moral right to respectful treatment is not mine alone. All individuals like me in the relevant respects must also have this right, have it equally, and have it independently of its recognition by the laws of this or that nation. This is part of what it means to speak of moral rights (see 8.1), and no account of moral rights or their validation can be adequate if it fails to meet these requirements. The analysis of rights as valid claims and the procedure outlined for validating them pass these tests, when it comes to possession of this right by moral agents. Since all moral agents are like me in the relevant respects (all have inherent value and all have it equally), all have the same right to respectful treatment that I do and all have this right equally. Moreover, since the basis for this right is independent of the legislative acts of any individual(s), our having this right is independent of its recognition by the laws of this or that nation. Indeed, precisely because the basis for this right is independent of the laws of any nation, appeals to this right can be used in the way Lyons recognizes—as a way "to argue for changes in the social order," including changes in the law itself.

2



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens.

KNDI GT
~~ANTHRO SHIZNIT~~
 RIGHTS

RIGHT to Fair treatment

— animals have the Right to not suffer

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
 2000 Temple University Press

Confusion about Animal Ethics

There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the public discourse on the moral status of animals. This confusion stems from two sources. First, it is thought by some that the animal rights position advocates that we accord to animals the same rights enjoyed by human beings. This is a misunderstanding of the animal rights position. I am not arguing that our recognition of the moral status of animals means that we are committed to treating animals and humans the same for all purposes, or that we must give animals a right to vote, or a right to own property, or a right to an education. My position is simple: we are obligated to extend to animals only one right—the right not to be treated as the property of humans.

Second, animal protection organizations, particularly in the United States, use the expression "animal rights" indiscriminately to describe any position, including purely regulatory or animal welfare measures, that is thought to reduce animal suffering. For example, a proposal to increase the size of cages used to hold laying hens assumes the legitimacy of treating animals as property; it is aimed at regulating our ownership of animals. A proposal that we abolish the egg industry altogether as a violation of the basic right of animals not to be used as our resources is an animal rights position. Yet animal protection organizations label both positions as advancing animal rights. Some animal advocates support such regulatory measures as means of eventually achieving the abolition of particular animal uses. There is, however, no empirical evidence that the regulation of animal exploitation leads to the abolition of exploitation.²⁰

3



rights
|Right to fair treatmentMust end the unnecessary suffering
of animals

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

These two intuitions that encompass our conventional wisdom about animals are represented in the *humane treatment principle*, which has been an entrenched and uncontroversial part of our culture since the nineteenth century. The humane treatment principle holds that we may prefer human interests over animal interests, but that we may do so only when it is necessary and that we therefore ought not to inflict unnecessary suffering on animals. The humane treatment principle is not only a moral rule but a legal rule as well: *animal welfare laws* purport to prohibit us from inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals. Moreover, our reason for prohibiting unnecessary animal suffering is not only that inflicting such suffering will make us act less kindly toward each other, but that we believe that it is a wrong to the animals themselves.

In order to determine whether a particular animal use or treatment is necessary under the humane treatment principle, we must balance animal interests and human interests. If the balance tips in favor of humans—if human interests in inflicting harm on an animal are stronger than the animal's interests in not being made to suffer—we consider that the use or treatment is morally justified because it is necessary. If the balance tips in favor of animals, then the infliction of harm is not morally justified because it is considered unnecessary. This balancing of interests is certainly not a precise operation, and we may very well disagree in our assessments of the relative weight of competing human and animal interests in particular cases, as well as about what constitutes necessary suffering. But whatever differences we may otherwise have, we *must* agree that if the prohibition against unnecessary suffering is to have any meaning at all, it is morally and legally wrong to inflict suffering on animals merely for our amusement or pleasure. We must agree that there are some meaningful limits on our use and treatment of animals.

KND I

ANTHRO SHIZNET

3

Pain deserves Rights

1/3

— PAIN, THE BASIS FOR MORALITY, IS SUFFERED BY ANIMALS — THAT GIVES THEM RIGHTS

Kevin DOLAN 1999 (Ethics, Animals and Science SThl (JusCan), BD, DipLaw, FIAT. HV 4708 .D58) pg. 151

analyst
The presence of awareness is fundamental to concern about the supposed suffering and pain of other creatures. Moral concern for others is cogent only on the presumption that others have subjective experiences, that we can more or less know them, that their subjective states matter to them more or less as ours matter to us, and that our actions have major effects on what matters to them and on what they subjectively experience. *pain*
pres If we genuinely did not believe that others felt pain, pleasure, fear, joy, etc., there would be little point to moral locutions or moral exhortations. Morality supposes that the objects of our moral concern have feelings.
it's the basis
The presumption of feeling is a necessary condition for moral concern but it is not the only condition. One must also believe that the feelings of others warrant our attention. For most of us, the realization that others, human or non-human, experience negative feelings in the same way that we ourselves do, is enough to generate a stance of moral concern; it is irrelevant whether that moral concern arises out of rational self-interest (Hobbes), innate sympathy (Hume), or a sense of a rational requirement to universalizability (Kant). Whatever its supposed source, that concern is the basis of moral conduct and the justification for sympathetic behaviour.

6

Pain deserves Rights

THE Pain card

Animals are capable and do feel pain.

Kevin DOLAN 1999 (Ethics, Animals and Science SThl (JusCan), BD, DipLaw, FIAT. HV 4708 .D58) pg. 156

The universality of pain

ANAL

RES

GUARD

PAIN

PROVES

*

*

pink

mark

Pain is perhaps one of the most vivid forms of awareness. Pain and similar forms of experience are at the heart of any ethical discussion of the use of animals in research. The essence of legality in the use of animals in research is 'regulated procedure', the essential feature of which is the avoidance of 'pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm'. Every one knows by experience what pain is. There is no concept whose objective existence has been so empirically and universally established yet all direct knowledge of it is necessarily subjective and any clear definition of it proves elusive. One working dictionary definition of pain is an adverse sensation experienced when the body is injured or afflicted in some way. In a scientific setting, pain is associated with such nociceptive systems as sensory, motor and memory systems. In this context it may be defined as an adverse sensory experience caused by actual or potential injury which is accompanied by protective somatic and visceral reactions and induces changes in behaviour including social behaviour which can be specific for an individual animal (UFAW 1989).

Pain and suffering are rampant in nature. The slightest mistake in life or an inadvertent exposure to infection on the part of any creature can bring immediate, inevitable and dire consequences, even death.

A major relationship in the existence of most species is that of prey and predator - nature is red in tooth and claw. This may be reminiscent of the pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer but he was one of the first among the philosophers to claim that animals shared (the privilege of?) awareness of suffering with us. He argued vigorously, as we have seen, against Descartes's opinion that animals could not feel pain. Schopenhauer's thoughts, however, did not concentrate solely on suffering; he claimed that he had observed his dog, called World-Soul, seeking a mechanical explanation for the mode of operation of some new curtains.

Animal pain

animals

Feel

pain

In the past, doubt may have been expressed about the fact that animals felt pain. It was probably, in practice, more a matter of ignoring the existence of pain amongst animals and being indifferent to animal suffering. In fact there is no justification for the Cartesian assumption that animals have no feelings. Descartes must have sat in a coach, heard a coachman crack his whip and experienced the reaction of the horses to an anticipated unpleasant experience.

The mechanisms responsible for pain behaviour are remarkably similar in all vertebrates. Anaesthetics and analgesics control what appears to be pain in all vertebrates and some invertebrates. The biological feedback mechanisms for controlling pain seem to be remarkably similar in all vertebrates, involving serotonin.

Endorphins, enkephalins and substance P. Endorphins have even been found in earthworms. The existence of endogenous opiates indicates that animals are capable of feeling pain. They would hardly have neurochemicals and pain-inhibiting systems identical to ours and hardly show the same diminution of pain signs as we do if their experiential pain was not being controlled by these mechanisms in the same way that ours is.

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT
3

Pain Deserves Rights


3/3

Sentient beings relate to each other in the area of rights

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

Not all animals may be sentient, and it may be difficult to draw the line separating those who are capable of consciously experiencing pain and suffering from those who are not. There is, however, no doubt that most of the animals we exploit are sentient. Although we may not know whether insects are capable of consciously experiencing pain, we know that primates, cows, pigs, chickens, and rodents are sentient and capable of subjective mental experiences. Indeed, it is widely accepted by scientists that many fish and other sea animals are sentient. I may not know whether a dog feels pain in exactly the same way that I do, but then I cannot really know whether another human being feels pain in exactly the same way that I do. If you tell me that you are in pain in a language that I understand, I assume that you mean the same thing that I mean when I say I am in pain. But I do not know. I have no access to your mind that allows me to prove that our experiences are identical. Unless I have some reason to believe that you are lying or otherwise deceiving me, I assume that you are in pain because you and I share certain neurological and physiological similarities that make it likely that your sensation of pain is similar to mine. Likewise, I may not know whether my dog experiences pain in exactly the same way I do, but I have no doubt that dogs and cows and pigs and chickens are the types of beings who are neurologically and physiologically able to experience pain and to suffer. In this sense, all sentient beings, despite any differences, are similar to each other and dissimilar to everything else in the world that is not sentient.

Sentient
beings
+ feel
pain



Every time you masturbate...
God kills a kitten
Please, think of the kittens

3

Interests deserve Rights

— animals have interests and therefore
deserve rights

Francione, Professor of Law, 2000. [Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?]

arguing
the
existence
of interest

There is a great deal of confusion surrounding the concept of rights. For our purposes, we need focus on only one aspect of the concept of a right that is common to virtually all theories about rights: a right is a particular way of protecting interests. To say that an interest is protected by a right is to say that the interest is protected against being ignored or violated simply because this will benefit someone else. We can think of a right of any sort as a fence or a wall that surrounds an interest and upon which hangs a "no trespass" sign that forbids entry, even if it would be beneficial to the person seeking that entry. As one writer describes it, rights are "moral notions that grow out of respect for the individual. They build protective fences around the individual. They establish areas where the individual is entitled to be protected against the state and the majority even where a price is paid by the general welfare."¹⁷

Interests Deserve Rights

Animal interests deserve protection + Rights

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

The Solution: Taking Animal Interests Seriously

If we want to take animal interests seriously and give content to our professed rejection of the infliction of unnecessary suffering on them, we can do so in only one way: by applying *the principle of equal consideration*, or the rule that we must treat likes alike, to animals. There is nothing exotic or particularly complicated about the principle of equal consideration. Indeed, this principle is part of every moral theory and, like the humane treatment principle, is one that most of us already accept in our everyday thinking about moral issues. Applying the principle of equal consideration to animals does not mean that we are committed to the view that animals are the "same" as humans (whatever that means), or that animals are our "equals" in all respects. It means only that if humans and animals do have a similar interest, we must treat that interest

in the same way unless there is a good reason for not doing so. Our conventional wisdom about animals is that they are similar to us in at least one way: they are sentient and they are the sorts of beings who, like us, have an interest in not suffering. In this sense, we are similar to each other and dissimilar to everything else in the universe that is not sentient.

Interests Deserve Rights

Locke, Professor of Management and Psychology at the University of Maryland at College Park [Edwin A., <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Takingsides1.html>, "Animals and Rights?," September 29]

The argument that animals cannot communicate has been disproved. Common examples of nonhuman animal communication include dolphin communication, chimpanzees who have been taught American sign language and the body and facial language used by dogs.

determining
legal
rights for
animals

In determining whether nonhuman animals should have legal rights, it helps to understand why human beings have legal rights. Not all interests carry equal weight and it is the role of lawmakers to decide which interests deserve protection as legal rights and strike a balance among competing interests.

Animals are like us in ways that are morally and legally significant. They experience pain and pleasure and desire to experience pleasure and avoid pain. In other words, they have interests.

Those who argue against legal rights for animals would stress the differences between humans and other animals. None of those differences is legally or morally justifiable. In all legally important ways, other animals possess the qualities that compel us to put aside convention and convenience, and realize that we have ignored and violated their rights for far too long.

Animals have inherent value

We must assume all inherent value in
beings is equal

Tom Regan 85 (Philosophy @ N. Carolina State U., "The Case for Animal Rights" - in "In Defense of animals") p. 23

Well, perhaps some will say that animals have some inherent value, only less than we have. Once again, however, attempts to defend this view can be shown to lack rational justification. What could be the basis of our having more inherent value than animals? Their lack of reason, or autonomy, or intellect? Only if we are willing to make the same judgement in the case of humans who are similarly deficient. But it is not true that such humans – the retarded child, for example, or the mentally deranged – have less inherent value than you or I. Neither, then, can we rationally sustain the view that animals like them in being the experiencing subjects of a life have less inherent value. All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not.

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

213

6 animals have inherent value

Animals have inherent value. + deserve respect

Regan, author, 1989 [Tom, ed. Regan. Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 112-13]

[Well, perhaps some will say that animals have some inherent value, only less than we have. Once again, however, attempts to defend this view can be shown to lack rational justification. What could be the basis of our having more inherent value than animals? Their lack of reason, or autonomy, or intellect? Only if we are willing to make the same judgment in the case of humans who are similarly deficient. But it is not true that such humans—the retarded child, for example, or the mentally deranged—have less inherent value than you or I. Neither, then, can we rationally sustain the view that animals like them in being the experiencing subjects of a life have less inherent value. All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not.]

Inherent value, then, belongs equally to those who are the experiencing subjects of a life. Whether it belongs to others—to rocks and rivers, trees and glaciers, for example—we do not know and may never know. But neither do we need to know, if we are to make the case for animal rights. We do not need to know, for example, how many people are eligible to vote in the next presidential election before we can know whether I am. Similarly, we do not need to know how many individuals have inherent value before we can know that some do. When it comes to the case for animal rights, then, what we need to know is whether the animals that, in our culture, are routinely eaten, hunted, and used in our laboratories, for example, are like us in being subjects of a life. And we do know this. We do know that many—literally, billions and billions—of these animals are the subjects of a life in the sense explained and so have inherent value if we do. And since, in order to arrive at the best theory of our duties to one another, we must recognize our equal inherent value as individuals, reason—not sentiment, not emotion—reason compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals and, with this, their equal right to be treated with respect. 112-3

12



Every time you masturbate...

God kills a kitten

Please, think of the kittens

KNDI GT
Anthro Shiznit

animals have inherent value

3/3

1. Animals have an inherent value equal to that of humans.

Regan, author, 1989 [Tom, ed. Regan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. 111]

The rights view, I believe, is rationally the most satisfactory moral theory. It surpasses all other theories in the degree to which it illuminates and explains the foundation of our duties to one another—the domain of human morality. On this score it has the best reasons, the best arguments, on its side. Of course, if it were possible to show that only human beings are included within its scope, then a person like myself, who believes in animal rights, would be obliged to look elsewhere.

But attempts to limit its scope to humans only can be shown to be rationally defective. Animals, it is true, lack many of the abilities humans possess. They can't read, do higher mathematics, build a bookcase, or make *baba ghanoush*. Neither can many human beings, however, and yet we don't (and shouldn't) say that they (these humans) therefore have less inherent value, less of a right to be treated with respect, than do others. It is the similarities between those human beings who most clearly, most noncontroversially have such value (the people reading this, for example), not our differences, that matter most. And the really crucial, the basic similarity is simply this: we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death—all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. As the same is true of those animals that concern us (the ones that are eaten and trapped, for example), they too must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own. m-2



K.M.D.E. G.T.

RIGHTS

animals are rational

Animals Have rationality, intelligence and can communicate:
all a basis for rights.

Hargrove, Professor in Department of Philosophy, 1992. [Eugene C., University of North Texas, State U. of NY Press]

make more for
themselves

But many animals show every sign of remembering past events and of anticipating future ones, as anyone's dog does, and they actively communicate their needs and desires to us through behavior that certainly appears to be intentional. Clearly these animals must be accepted as self-conscious on the same grounds that we accept the self-consciousness of other human beings. They have some rationality and intelligence, they communicate through sign systems that are much less versatile than is human language but is nevertheless as adequate for expressing many personal wants and desires as in human speech (particularly from a purely behavioral standpoint), and they give every indication of knowing when they are hurt. They understand general principles of various sorts, and dogs and chimpanzees, for example, apparently understand some moral principles (which would make them moral entities according to the reciprocity framework), and even seem on occasion to try sincerely and intentionally to live up to moral principles (which would occasionally make them moral agents). >

animals are rational

are as capable of
Animals ~~capable of~~ Reason as humans are

Peter Singer 85 (philosophy, bioethics, Monash University. Author, "In Defense of Animals" prologue) p.6

AT: Someone might say: 'It is not because we are members of the human species that we are justified in overriding the interests of other animals; it is because we are rational and they are not.'
(diagn.) Someone else might argue that it is because we are autonomous beings, or because we can use language, or because we are self-conscious, or because we have a sense of justice. All these contentions and more have been invoked to justify us in sacrificing the interests of other animals to our own.

★ One way of replying would be to consider whether non-human animals really do lack these allegedly important characteristics. The more we learn of some non-human animals, particularly chimpanzees but also many other species, the less able we are to defend the claim that we humans are unique because we are the only ones capable of reasoning, or of autonomous action or of the use of language, or because we possess a sense of justice. I shall not go into this reply here because it would take a long time and it would do nothing for the many species of animals who could not be said to meet whatever test was being proposed.

fail, There is a much shorter rejoinder. Let us return to the passage I have quoted from Bentham, for he anticipated the objection. After dismissing the idea that number of legs, roughness of skin or fine details of bone formation should 'trace the insuperable line' between those who have moral standing and those who do not, Bentham goes on to ask what else might mark this boundary:

Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?

★ Bentham is clearly right. Whatever the test we propose as a means of separating human from non-human animals, it is plain that if non-human animals are going to fail it, some humans will fail as well. Infants are neither rational nor autonomous. They do not use language and they do not possess a sense of justice. Are they therefore to be treated like non-human animals, to be fattened for the table, if we should fancy the taste of their flesh, or to be used to find out if some new shampoo will blister human eyeballs?

KNDI GT
RIGHTS
8

animals are rational

313

Rationality not necessary prerequisite to rights but animals are rational anyways!

Kevin DOLAN 1999 (Ethics, Animals and Science SThl
(JusCan), BD, DipLaw, FIAT. HV 4708 .D58) pg. 137

There is a long tradition attributing rights only to rational beings yet no intrinsic logical connection can be derived from the definition of either rights or rationality. In practice one need not be an active, moral and rational agent in order to have rights. Rights are not denied to infants or comatose patients. One might suspect, and rightly so, that there may be some so-called 'dumb beasts' who qualify more highly in the rationality stakes than some human beings. Concern by some birds with eggs

140 Ethics and Animals

↓
Animal
AT:
clally:
-comas
-malis
-ing
clutch size may be regarded as goal-directed behaviour. This form of awareness, and action consequent upon such awareness, has in the past been assumed to be specifically human. Our growing knowledge of animal behaviour of this type, fudges a little any clear distinction between rational animals and the rest of the animal kingdom. Further evidence which frays somewhat the traditional demarcation between ourselves and the other animals continually appears as research progresses. Experiments at the University of Oklahoma's Institute of Primate Studies indicated that certain specially-brought-up chimpanzees were competent to some degree in the sentence functions of language. It is unproven that only a being that can give linguistic expression to thought has the power to think. Various forms of non-linguistic animal behaviour may be taken by some as indicative of thought. Unfortunately there is no way, even if we grant that animals can think in some form, we can ascertain that they can think reflectively, or have thoughts as such. However much these involved arguments might edge some animals towards being accepted as quasi-rational creatures, it is of little consequence. Animals are fully adapted for autonomous existence. In the face of life's challenges they have proved themselves to be as adequate as human beings are in similar circumstances. It appears (unlikely) to reject claims concerning rights for animals with arguments based (merely) on the doubtful lack of the specific quality of the ability to think.

KNDI GT
Anthro Shizmit

1/2

5

Human Rights not same as animal Rights

— Animal Rights must be viewed as ethical guidelines and not as being the same as human Rights

Kevin DOLAN 1999 (Ethics, Animals and Science SThl (JusCan), BD, DipLaw, FIAT. HV 4708 .D58) pg. 141

It may be argued that animals in the wild do not give each other rights but their situation differs from what occurs when they interface with human beings. In the absence of humans, natural mechanisms operate to control their behaviour and regulate their numbers for the good of the entire ecosystem. However, because human beings exploit animals and alter ecosystems, rights for animals may need to be elaborated as ethical guidelines or as moral restraints. A Declaration of Animal Rights cannot be expected from animals because as British Rail printed in bold type in their pamphlet on animal transport: 'ANIMALS CAN'T COMPLAIN'.

ANALYTIC
ST: 1/2-4

KNDI GT
ANTHRO SHIZNIT

213

Human Rights not same
as animal Rights


Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

The humane treatment principle and the animal welfare laws that reflect it require that we balance the interests of animals against our interests when we use animals for a particular purpose. To balance interests means to assess the relative strengths of conflicting interests. If our interests in inflicting suffering outweigh the animals' interests, then our interests prevail and the animal suffering is regarded as necessary. If no justifiable human interests are at stake, then the infliction of suffering

on animals must be regarded as unnecessary. For example, the British law regulating the use of animals in experiments requires that before any experiment is approved, it is necessary to "weigh the likely adverse effects on the animals concerned against the [human] benefit likely to accrue."²² The humane treatment principle seems to say that we may use animals, but only when it is necessary to do so—only when we are faced with a true emergency analogous to the burning house scenario that requires us to make a choice—and that we should impose only the minimum amount of pain and suffering necessary for our purpose. If a prohibition against unnecessary suffering of animals is to have any meaningful content, we must not inflict suffering on animals merely for our pleasure, amusement, or convenience. If there is a feasible alternative to our use of animals in a particular situation, then the principle would seem to proscribe such use.

—f

18



A2 Cartesian Thinking

Cartesian Rational Subjectivity Justifies not just neglect but abuse of nonhuman animals

BANDY MALAMUD ASST. PROF OF ENGLISH GEORGIA STATE 1998 READING
ZOO PAGE 66-67

Jim Mason delineates an intellectual sensibility that preceded (and enabled) animals' subjugation in zoos as well as other forms of animal oppression. He traces Western theories that legitimize human domination over animals back to Aristotle – who wrote in *Politics* that animals exist for the sake of people – and cites Bacon and Descartes as laying the foundation for exploiting animals as inferior beings. From religious sources such as the description of Eden in Genesis

Bacon

Hume

KANT

→

AN

⊗

we got the notion that conquering nature is permissible, but from Bacon we got the notion that it is desirable. Human ambition makes us want to do it, said Bacon. Knowledge is power, he said, which legalized and elevated the vigorous pursuit of both. Pursuit of power, especially power over nature became an obsession, an end unto itself in the scientific age. Descartes published ideas that further strengthened the case for humanity's conquest of nature. Descartes's major contribution was to completely sever any connection between man and nature and to place an absolute gap between them. (37)

Humanity was established as a ruling class, immensely superior to the rest of the supposedly insensible and inert natural world

and thus essentially unrelated to it. Cartesian thinking 'justified the elevation of humans over nature' (38) and rationalized people's exercise of domination over animals. Such ideas mesh with political and mercantile imperialism to create an ethos that celebrates on all fronts the captivity and display of wild animals in the zoo, which Mason characterizes as an institution promoting 'the reinforcement and recycling of human supremacy, mastery over beasts, victory over nature' (255). Mary Midgley cites other philosophical traditions that exclude moral consideration for animals, thereby rendering them subordinate: Hume's exemption of animals from justice or the possession of rights, property, and social claims, and Kant's denial of duty to animals (48-52).

A2 Cartesian Thinking

Descartes claimed animals are no different from machines

Francione, Gary B. Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog?
2000 Temple University Press

Descartes

As late as the seventeenth century, the view was advanced that animals are nothing more than robots, with no ability to think or feel. For example, René Descartes (1596–1650), considered the founder of modern philosophy, maintained that animals are not conscious—they have no mind whatsoever—because they do not possess a soul, which God invested only in human beings. In support of the idea that animals lack consciousness, Descartes argued that they do not use verbal or sign language—something that every human being does but that no animal does. Descartes certainly recognized that animals act in what appear to be purposive and intelligent ways and that they seem to be conscious, but he claimed that they are really no different from machines made by God. Indeed, he referred to animals as “automatons or moving machines.”¹ Moreover, just as a clock can tell time better than human beings can, so some animal machines can perform some tasks better than humans can.

An obvious implication of Descartes’s position—and one that he readily accepted—was that animals are not sentient; they are not conscious of pain, pleasure, or anything else.² Descartes and his followers performed experiments in which they nailed animals by their paws onto boards and cut them open to reveal their beating hearts. They burned, scalded, and mutilated animals in every conceivable manner. When the animals reacted as though they were suffering pain, Descartes dismissed the reaction as no different from the sound of a machine that was functioning improperly. A crying dog, Descartes maintained, is no different from a whining gear that needs oil.

In Descartes’s view, it is as senseless to talk about our moral obligations to animals, machines created by God, as it is to talk about our moral obligations to clocks, machines created by humans. We can have moral obligations that *concern* the clock, but any such obligations are really owed to other humans and not to the clock itself. If I smash the clock with a hammer, you may object because the clock belongs to you, or because I injure you when a piece of the smashed clock accidentally strikes you, or because it is wasteful to smash a perfectly good clock that could be used by someone else. I may be similarly obligated not to damage your dog, but the obligation is owed to you, not to the dog. The dog, like the clock, according to Descartes, is nothing more than a machine and possesses no interests in the first place.³

22

